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It is demonstrated that a recently suggested model for the EPR-Bohm spin experiment, based on Clifford algebra valued
local variables and observables, runs into very serious difficulties and can therefore not be taken as constituting a viable
counter-example to Bell’s theorem.
In a recent paper [1], Christian has proposed a local realistic
model for the EPR-Bohm spin experiment, in which the hid-
den variable space is taken to be a subset of the Clifford al-
gebra, Cl(3), of Euclidean 3-space, E3, rather than E3 itself,
as in Bell’s local realistic model [2]. More specifically, the
hidden variable is taken to be the unit trivector, µ = ±I,
where I denotes the (right-handed) unit pseudoscalar, i.e.
I = exeyez, with {ex, ey, ez} a right-handed orthonormal
basis for E3 and I2 = −1. Here, the notation of Ref. [1]
is adopted (note that although a trivector, µ actually is a
“scalarlike” quantity, as it commutes with every element of
Cl(3)). In physical terms, the hidden variable of each spin-
1/2 particle thus represents the orientation of an orthonor-
mal triad and effectively is just an element of Z2 ≃ {±1}.
Now, despite the fact that the model formally manages to
reproduce some quantum theoretical expectation values cor-
rectly (see also below), this effective Z2-valued character
of the hidden variable is likely to lead to some suspicions
about the model’s prospects to yield the same results as
ordinary quantum theory in all relevant cases. These suspi-
cions are confirmed when comparing the predictions of the
model for the outcomes of individual spin experiments with
those of ordinary quantum theory. The observable, An(µ),
that represents the measurement outcome of a spin-meter
(i.e. Stern-Gerlach apparatus) A in the direction of the unit
vector n, with the particle that entered that meter in the
hidden variable state µ, is defined within the model as (cf.
Eq. (16) of Ref. [1])
An(µ) := µ · n (1)
Although the right-hand side of Eq. (1) has the appearance
of a scalar quantity, µ ·n actually is a bivector - alternatively,
modulo a sign, it is the (Hodge) dual of an ordinary vector,
i.e. n. But from a strictly experimental perspective, all that
is required of the spin-meter observable is that it be a quan-
tity that represents measurement outcomes in terms of +
and − relative to the direction n in which spin is measured
and for this purpose the definition A′
n
(µ) := µI−1 sgn(n∗),
with sgn and n∗ denoting respectively the sign function and
the first nonzero component of n with respect to the basis
{ex, ey, ez}, already suffices, as this definition leads to the
same outcomes for individual measurements as the defini-
tion (1). The sole purpose of the extra degree of freedom
introduced in the definition (1) is to serve as a vehicle to
circumvent Bell’s theorem. As will be seen shortly however,
it actually fails at this since the definition (1), when ex-
tended to more than one particle, either does not correctly
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describe the correlations between two particles in an EPR-
Bohm context or leads to other types of inconsistency with
experiment. But there is already a serious difficulty with the
definition of the spin-meter observable to correctly represent
the outcomes of repeated measurements on a single particle
in orthogonal directions. To see this, suppose for definiteness
that a spin-measurement is carried out in the ez-direction
and that the particle which enters the meter is in the hidden
variable state µ = +I, so that Aez (I) = Iez, i.e. the mea-
surement outcome is “spin up” in the positive z-direction (it
would of course also be possible to have Iez correspond to
the “down” leg of a Stern-Gerlach apparatus oriented in the
positive z-direction, so the present choice - and mutatis mu-
tandis for the other directions - is merely the most natural
one; in any case, this choice does not affect the conclusions
to be derived below). A second spin measurement is sub-
sequently performed on the particle, but the experimenter
now has the choice to measure spin in either the ex-direction
or the ez-direction. Because µ is a local deterministic hid-
den variable, its value cannot depend on the choice made
by the experimenter. If this value is left unchanged by the
first measurement, performing the second measurement in
the ex-direction would result in “spin up” in this direction
with certainty, in contradiction with the usual quantum pre-
dictions. But if the value of µ changes as a result of the first
measurement, such that it would yield the outcomes “spin
up” and “spin down” in the ex-direction with equal proba-
bilities, this would lead to the wrong statistics if the second
measurement were in fact carried out in the ez-direction.
Note that the spin-meter observable in Bell’s model [2], as
defined in Eq. (9) of that reference, suffers from the same
difficulty (as may e.g. be seen by subsequently performing
measurements in the positive z- and x-directions, selecting
the outcomes ++ and then performing a measurement in
the positive z-direction again), but that the alternative defi-
nition in Eq. (4) does not - alternatively, with the definition
(9) one could presumably circumvent the difficulty by pos-
tulating that a spin measurement in the n-direction changes
the value of λ, such that it is described by a uniform prob-
ability distribution over the upper hemisphere with n as
the North Pole. An objection sometimes raised against the
above types of thought experiment, is that they contain an
assumption of “free choice” on the part of the experimenter.
As has been noted elsewhere however, if this assumption is
in fact not made, it would be hard to take science seriously,
as Nature could be in an insidious conspiracy to “confirm”
laws by denying us the freedom to make the tests that would
refute them [3]. Stated somewhat differently, without the as-
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sumption it would be necessary to radically distinguish the
concept of man-independent, “ontological reality” from that
of man-dependent, “empirical reality”, although it is some-
what ironic that some authors have argued for the absolute
necessity of a distinction between these concepts, precisely
because of the nonlocality that must be part - as a result of
Bell’s theorem and the experimental results - of any sensi-
ble notion that may be formed of “ontological reality” and
the absence of such nonlocality in most of the phenomena
composing “empirical reality” [4]. It seems however that if a
theory could be shown to exist that could provide a convinc-
ing, presumably testable explanation of how an objective,
effectively local “classical” world could emerge from a more
fundamental one that is in some important ways nonlocal,
it would not be imperative to distinguish between the two
notions of reality. In any case, without the free will assump-
tion, there is no need to resort to Clifford algebra valued
observables to construct local realist models for quantum
theory, and it does at any rate not appear that acknowledg-
ing the existence of two distinct conceptions of reality is part
of the official programmes of those seeking to construct such
models.
Apart from the difficulty associated with spin measurements
on a single particle, a second major difficulty with the model
is that the definition of the observable Bn(µ), correspond-
ing to a second, distant spin-meter B - also given in Eq.
(16) of Ref. [1] - does not take into account the experi-
mental fact that the observables An(µ), Bn(µ) should have
opposite signs for the outcome of a single EPR-Bohm spin
experiment with both meters set in the same direction n.
Consistency with experiment thus demands that (see also
Eq. (13) in Ref. [2])
Bn(µ) = −An(µ) (2)
The product Aa(µ)Bb(µ) (cf. Eq. (17) in Ref. [1]) now
picks up an extra sign, resulting in the wrong sign for its
expectation value in Eq. (19). The only way to avoid this
conclusion would be to artificially interpret the measure-
ment outcomes of the B-meter in precisely the opposite way;
i.e. to have Bn(I) = In correspond to the “down” leg of
a Stern-Gerlach apparatus B oriented in the direction n, if
An(I) = In corresponds to the “up” leg of a Stern-Gerlach
apparatus A oriented in the same direction, and similarly for
µ = −I. Although unnatural, such an alternative interpre-
tation would indeed lead to the correct expectation values
in the current context. However, it is not possible to consis-
tently extend this way of reasoning to describe correlations
between more than two particles. For instance, in order to
yield the correct expectation value for Aez (µ)Cez (µ) when
a system of three spin-1/2 particles is prepared in the prod-
uct state | + −+〉, with + and − respectively referring to
“up” and “down” in the ez-direction, the observable Cn(µ)
of the third particle would have to satisfy Cez (±I) = ∓Iez,
with −Iez corresponding to the “up” leg of the apparatus.
This would however lead to an incorrect expectation value
for Bez(µ)Cez (µ). Thus, the model is unable to take into
account the empirical constraints imposed by spin systems
involving more than two particles, despite the somewhat in-
triguing fact that it formally manages to exactly reproduce
the correct quantum expectation values in the case of two
particles (note however that the ordinary quantum observ-
ables in the present context are also effectively Clifford al-
gebra valued, since the algebra generated by 1 and −i times
the Pauli matrices is just the quaternion algebra, H, and
Cl(3) ≃ H ⊕ H). But is it possible to prove that any local
realistic model based on non-commuting spin-meter observ-
ables is non-viable ? In order to be consistent with the usual
quantum predictions any such observables, A(a, λ), B(b, λ),
with λ denoting a generic hidden variable, should satisfy
B(a, λ) = −A(a, λ) (again taking the EPR-Bohm case, for
definiteness, and keeping in mind the previous discussion)
and∫
dλρ(λ) [A(a, λ) , B(b, λ)] = 0 ,
∫
dλρ(λ)A2(a, λ) = 1
(3)
for all a and b. It is not immediately obvious that one could
prove such models to be inconsistent or to contradict quan-
tum theory as a matter of general principle. But what if
no such “in principle” proof is found ? Or what if a proof
is found that rules out only the associative algebras of ob-
servables (the Clifford product and its derived products are
associative, but even here some care is required as the cross
product × between two ordinary vectors, related to the de-
rived Clifford wedge product ∧ by duality, is not in general
associative) ? Should that then be taken as constituting a
genuinely plausible loophole for Bell’s theorem ? As already
noted, from a strictly experimental point of view all that
is required of a spin-meter observable is that it represents
measurement outcomes in terms of + and − relative to the
direction in which spin is measured and for this purpose it is
sufficient that it is a real-valued scalar quantity. The choice
to take instead a non-scalar quantity introduces an extra de-
gree of freedom, something for which there is at present no
basis in physical theory. It is not uncommon to encounter
the view that some radical change is required in conventional
physical theory in order to resolve the problem of unifying
quantum theory and general relativity. Yet, even though
it is of course impossible to predict with absolute certainty
what the nature of this change will ultimately turn out to
be - assuming a radical change is indeed needed - it is highly
questionable that it will involve a simple return to the local
worldview of classical physics.
I thank Dennis Dieks for some very helpful remarks.
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